Schlagwort: europäische Integration

Which Federalism for Europe? A Moslerian Path

6. Juni 2024
Matteo Bozzon
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Because of its historical novelty, even before the problems of the constitutional structure of the Communities and then of the Union, the process of European integration poses the task of determining the categories that are appropriate for conceiving the political reality to which it gives rise and for understanding its ‘constitution’ in the broad and etymological sense of the term.

What seems difficult to imagine is a political and legal reality able to meet two conditions: on the one hand, that Europe should be an entity capable of confronting the great world powers for the sake of world balance and peace; on the other hand, that its members should retain their autonomy and be political actors in their diversity, so that the citizens of the various member states do not perceive Europe as an entity that is alien or even hostile to them. Looking at the current situation, we can see how difficult it is to reconcile these two conditions.

Another Meaning of Federalism. Approaches to Hermann Moslers Legal Thinking

In this context, the recurring reference to ‘federalism’ seems to depend on the fact that it provides an inescapable interpretative framework for understanding the integration process, both for grasping its development and articulation, and for reflecting on the current state of the Union. Specifically, it is useful because of the need both to preserve the dynamic and open character of integration and to grasp the inherently plural configuration of the supranational reality in political and legal terms. This idea of a structurally plural unity cannot but have repercussions on how representation and the ‘democratic’ form of political participation can and should be understood, and on the sense of political obligation capable of preserving plurality.

However, the use of the term ‘federalism’ is subject to a number of constraints that derive from the tradition of thought that the term is used to denote (from the ways in which this tradition is taken up, reproduced, and, ultimately, projected into new contexts). One entrenched bias that inevitably affects the perception of the ‘federalist’ character of Europe is that its meaning can be exhausted by the dichotomy of federal state – confederation of states[1]. In this regard, it seems useful to recall and follow up a subterranean hint that can be found in the writings of Hermann Mosler, a hint which points toward another meaning of federalism, of which the ‘classical’ dichotomy retains only vague remnants. This is not to turn Mosler into a federalist thinker; nor is it to raise the question of the international legal effects of the constitutions of federal states, to which Mosler had already made an important contribution in 1949[2] and which has been the subject of numerous and quite relevant contributions by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law. The question, then, is what we can and should understand by federalism in relation to Europe on the basis of Mosler’s thinking.

‘Une communauté plus large et plus profonde’. The Foundation of the ECSC in 1951

Hermann Mosler speaks at the Institute. At the table: Gebhard Müller, President of the Federal Constitutional Court, Walter Hallstein, President of the EEC Commission and Hans Dölle, Director of the MPI for Comparative and International Private Law (from left to right).[3]

A first insight can be found in the commentary published in 1951 by the Institute’s Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht on the origin and qualification of the ECSC Treaty, which was to be the first step towards a political federation of the members of the nascent Community. Mosler, who, as is well known, took part in the negotiations as an adviser to Adenauer[4], begins by pointing out that, although the parties did not have in mind the creation of a mega-state, they did want to go a step beyond the realm of intergovernmental relations and create a closer community capable of overcoming the usual forms of international treaties and institutions of the international legal order.

One difficulty, therefore, was to understand exactly what the ‘European federation’ mentioned in the Schuman Declaration could be (which, among other things, was not transposed into the text of the Treaties, where it was referred to as ‘une communauté plus large et plus profonde’). If it meant nothing more than the establishment of a federal state, Mosler argued, “this idea may be politically revolutionary, but it is not a creative legal construction”[5]. What emerges in the first instance is the kind of unconditional reflex mentioned above: when it comes to creating a strong political unity beyond the nation-states, the term ‘federation’ automatically refers to a federal state (especially for those who come from the German historical experience). But it is worth noting that Mosler is no less clear that ‘federalism’ has a much broader meaning. In this sense, he emphasises that “despite all the similarities at the conference, however, it became clear that the methods familiar to the Germans for the co-operation of member associations in a higher unit, which itself has the character of a state, are alien to the other members of the Community”[6], France and Italy in primis. This clarification provides a valuable insight into Mosler’s thinking. Not only does he criticise the shadow of the federal form of (state‑)government, but he also stresses that the creation of a federal bond (“lien fédérale”[7]) is a completely new challenge, because “it is not theoretical concepts a priori, but practical necessities arising from the limited purpose of the union that must determine the construction of institutions”[8].

Federalism Beyond the Federal State

Animated debates. Joseph Kaiser, Hans Kutscher, Ulrich Scheuner and Fritz Münch (from left to right).[9]

Here it is difficult not to recognise what will become a salient feature of Mosler’s approach:  its “praxis-oriented” character (which is mentioned here, albeit in a cursory, almost programmatic manner)[10]. Secondly, however, it is clear that the concept of federalism is by no means exhausted in the state-federal form of organisation. Similarly, the emphasis on the absence of a priori theoretical concepts again signals the inadequacy of the Community as a confederation[11].

The idea of federalism beyond the federal state does not appear only occasionally in this paper. Another relevant reference can be found in Mosler’s brief contribution to the conference of the Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer held in Münster in 1962. The topic of the conference was “Federalism as a national and international principle of organisation”. Here Mosler points out that, from a historical perspective, federalism in international society does not exist per se as an attempt to create sovereign state units, but that it is characterised by the aspect of cooperation from below: “Such cooperation, if it leads to regional groupings, can give rise to a federal structure in the international sphere”[12]. In this sense, Mosler rejected the view of those interpreters who argued that federalism would come about by crossing the threshold of the federal state, remarking: “If the federal idea is to be brought to the international stage, the state element in the concept of federalism must be abandoned (…). We must take a more sober view of the process and say: cooperation and collaboration in the international sphere become what one might call ‘federal’ at a certain quantitative level. This happens when a stage is reached where it is permissible to say: here an essential area of public life is so firmly united in the long term that the bond – in sociological terms – is no longer likely to break”[13]. In the context of this quote, it is important not to confuse the call for sobriety with a ‘weak’ conception of federalism.

To complete this excursus, a final insight can be gained from The International Society as Legal Community, first published in 1974. Here, the subject of federalism converges in a discussion of “types of organised co-operation”[14]. There is an immediate warning: “It is necessary to beware of thinking too much on predetermined lines or in well-defined categories”[15]. The direction indicated by Mosler also this time relates to the aspect that “federalism is not confined to States composed of member countries, for it can also form part of the structure of international co-operation”[16]. In this sense, and especially with regard to the possible future of international society, it is stressed that federalism is “a very flexible form of organisation”[17]; the point to be made then relates to the possibility that there may be “other forms of federal cooperation […], which allow more freedom for the particular features of groups of States, for minorities, for different stages of economic and cultural development and so on. […] Co-operation through a federal structure is an appropriate legal arrangement, capable of guaranteeing the freedom of weak parties and providing for effective organisation”[18].

Conclusion. How to Think About Federalism?

On the basis of this cursory survey, it is now possible to draw some final schematic conclusions with regard to our European dimension. First, overcoming the bias towards state-centred federalism, the question of ‘which federalism for Europe?’ can be specified in ‘how to think about federalism?’. In relation to this question, it is the element of cooperation that becomes central, because it reopens the question of the foedus. If one sticks to the dichotomy of federal state – confederation of states, the foedus remains at most a nominal link through the term. On the contrary, in a conception of federalism emphasising the dimension of cooperation among a determined plurality that requires the participation of its members, the specific element of the foedus lies precisely in a kind of (political) unity produced by the legal agreement of different parts – and precisely for this reason it is not of state order. This federalist idea, therefore, stands or falls on its ability to guarantee plurality in the structure of representation.

However, one aspect must be clarified: to say that federal cooperation must not lead to a state-like unity does not mean that it cannot lead to any kind of unity tout court. A federation is a political unity that is constructed differently from the model of sovereign states, which can only mean a rethinking of what political obligation is and, above all, that it must tend to overcome its possible ‘otherness’ in relation to the members of the federation – insofar as this otherness risks undermining the active role of the members.

In other words, the crucial point is to reconcile the presence of the members, with their autonomy and diversity, and the unity of European ‘power’, without which the governance of global processes can only appear as a pious illusion. Of course, this has repercussions on the whole institutional configuration, the meaning and the relationship between powers. If we now recognise that in democratic states the (democratic) legitimation of power is one with the organisation of the powers of the constitution, then the problem does not seem to be the so-called democratic deficit of the European institutions but rather that democracy as a whole has to be conceived differently at the supranational level[19].

An attempt in this direction can be seen in the recent work of one of Mosler’s heirs as director of the MPIL, Armin von Bogdandy. He proposed to elaborate the concept of ‘European society’ mentioned in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (a society, it should be noted, understood as structurally plural: neither a monolith nor an undifferentiated mass of individuals)[20]. It is this society that is the singular ‘subject’ of a European constitutionalism (beyond the state and without the state) which, apart from the idea of collective self-determination, goes hand in hand with the need for a democracy of multiple mediations.

Again, federalism in the sense indicated seems to be the most appropriate interpretative scheme to frame this form of democracy. From this point of view, recalling once again Mosler’s insights, it would be worth asking, especially from a practical point of view, how many and which federal thresholds have already been reached with the current institutional organisation of the European Union.

[1] For a different direction, see, inter alia: Armin von Bogdandy, Supranationaler Föderalismus als Wirklichkeit und Idee einer neuen Herrschaftsform. Zur Gestalt der Europäischen Union nach Amsterdam, Baden-Baden: Nomos 1999; Stefan Oeter, »Föderation« oder »Bund« als Oberbegriff: Erscheinungsformen des Föderalen jenseits von Bundesstaat und Staatenbund, in Eva Marlene Hausteiner (ed.), Föderalismen. Modelle jenseits des Staates, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2016, 235-266.

[2] See: Hermann Mosler, Die völkerrechtliche Wirkung bundesstaatlicher Verfassungen. Eine Untersuchung zum Völkerrecht und zum vergleichenden Verfassungsrecht, Tübingen: Mohr 1949.

[3]  Photo: MPIL.

[4] Rudolf Bernhardt/Karin Oellers-Frahm, Das Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht. Geschichte und Entwicklung von 1949 bis 2013, Contributions on Comparative Public Law and International Law, , vol. 270, Berlin: Springer 2018, 8-9.

[5] Hermann Mosler, Der Vertrag über die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl. Entstehung und Qualifizierung, HJIL 14 (1951), 1-45, 33, translated by the author.

[6] Mosler, Vertrag (Fn. 5), 33-34.

[7] Mosler, Vertrag (Fn. 5), 34.

[8] Mosler, Vertrag (Fn. 5), 34.

[9]  Photo: MPIL.

[10] See: Felix Lange, Praxisorientierung und Gemeinschaftskonzeption. Hermann Mosler als Wegbereiter der westdeutschen Völkerrechtswissenschaft nach 1945, Contributions on Comparative Public Law and International Law, vol. 262, Berlin: Springer 2017.

[11] For a comparison with Walter Hallstein’s state-federal proposals, see Lange (Fn. 10), 171-174, 318-323.

[12] Föderalismus als nationales und internationales Ordnungsprinzip. Die öffentliche Sache: Aussprache zu den Berichten in den Verhandlungen der Tagung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer zu Münster (Westfalen) vom 3. bis 6. Oktober 1962, Berlin: De Gruyter 1964 (VVDStRL), 139, translated by the author.

[13] Föderalismus (Fn, 12), 139.

[14] Hermann Mosler, The International Society as Legal Community, Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 140, Leiden: Brill Nijhoff 1974, 1-320, 197.

[15] Mosler, International Society (Fn. 14), 203.

[16] Mosler, International Society (Fn. 14), 204.

[17]Mosler, International Society (Fn. 14), 204.

[18] Mosler, International Society (Fn. 14), 204.

[19] On this crucial aspect, see Giuseppe Duso, Reinventare la democrazia. Dal popolo sovrano all’agire politico dei cittadini, Milano: FrancoAngeli 2022.

[20] Armin von Bogdandy, The emergence of European society through public law: a Hegelian and anti-Schmittian approach, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2024.

Grundrechtsschutz in den Gemeinschaften

Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European Communities

8. Mai 2024
Frank Schorkopf
Kommentare 2
Deutsch

Wie das MPIL in den 1970er Jahren mit seinem „Heidelberg Approach“ half, eine Krise zu lösen

Im Mai 1974 veröffentlichte das Bundesverfassungsgericht seinen berühmten Solange-I-Beschluss. Der Zweite Senat hatte den fehlenden Grundrechtsschutz in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften zum Anlass genommen, europäisches Sekundärrecht weiterhin an deutschen Grundrechten zu prüfen, bis es einen vom Europäischen Parlament beschlossenen Grundrechtskatalog geben würde.[1] Die Entscheidung löste eine juristisch-diplomatische Krise aus – die den Ereignissen sehr ähnelte, die sich nach dem PSPP-Urteil vom Mai 2020 abspielten.[2]

Es ist bislang wenig bekannt, dass das Max-Planck-Institut aktiv daran beteiligt war, diese Krise zu lösen – um diese Episode soll es in der folgenden Miniatur gehen. Sie gibt am Ende Gelegenheit zu einer These über die Rolle des Europarechts in Arbeit und Selbstverständnis des Instituts zum Ende der 1990er Jahre.

Grundrechte sind „herausragende Errungenschaften des modernen Verfassungsstaates.“[3] Stets schützen sie das Individuum, indem sie die Staatsgewalt begrenzen und politische Beteiligung ermöglichen; in manchen Rechtsordnungen versprechen Grundrechte zudem soziale Teilhabe. Wenn der Europäische Gerichtshof die Gemeinschaftsgewalt aus einer autonomen Rechtsordnung heraus begründete, um das Handeln der Europäische Union von den Mitgliedstaaten möglichst unabhängig zu machen, dann benötigte diese auch eine akzeptable Form des Grundrechtsschutzes.

Rudolf Bernhardt anlässlich seiner Einführung als Institutsdirektor, 1970[4]

So argumentierte im Kern eine Studie, die Rudolf Bernhardt, seinerzeit Direktor des Instituts, über „Probleme eines Grundrechtskatalogs für die Europäischen Gemeinschaften“ im Bulletin der Gemeinschaften 1976 veröffentlichte. Die Studie wurde zusammen mit einem Bericht der Europäischen Kommission über den „Schutz der Grundrechte bei der Schaffung und Fortentwicklung des Gemeinschaftsrechts“ publiziert.[5] Diese Kopplung war kein Zufall. Die Kommission hatte die Studie bei Bernhardt in Auftrag gegeben. Sie sollte ihre Strategie für eine Grundrechtsbindung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften unterfüttern.

Die Studie ist rechtsvergleichend angelegt, wofür Bernhardt die Expertise der Referenten anzapfte. An der Studie, die die Grundrechtsbindung in den weiteren Mitgliedstaaten der Gemeinschaften untersuchte, wirkten unter anderem Karin Oellers, Eckart Klein und Christian Tomuschat mit. Die im Ton nüchterne, gediegene Studie kam zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Gemeinschaft sehr wohl an Grundrechte in Form allgemeiner Rechtsgrundsätze gebunden sei, die – der Natur des Verfahrens geschuldet – nur schrittweise entwickelt werden könnten. Gleichwohl bestünden Rechtsunsicherheit und die Bindung der Gemeinschaftsorgane, namentlich die des Europäischen Parlaments, des Rates und der Kommission, sei nicht immer eindeutig.

Die Studie endete mit der überraschenden Empfehlung, die drei Organe eine Erklärung abgeben zu lassen, an die vom Gerichtshof entwickelten Grundrechte gebunden zu sein. So ist es gekommen: Am 5. April 1977 unterzeichneten die Präsidenten der drei Organe, Kommissionspräsident Roy Jenkins, Parlamentspräsident Emilio Colombo und Ratspräsident David Owen, in Luxemburg die Gemeinsame Erklärung,[6] mit der sie die Organe an den prätorischen Grundrechtschutz banden.[7] Der Gerichtshof selbst blieb außen vor, was methodisch‑praktisch verständlich war, denn schließlich erkannte –das heißt erfand und konkretisierte – er ebenjene Gemeinschaftsgrundrechte. Dennoch entstand ein Muster, wie der zurückhaltende Umgang des Gerichtshofs mit der proklamierten, juristisch noch nicht in Kraft getretenen Charta der Grundrechte gut 20 Jahre später zeigte.

Dass die Zweifel an einer Grundrechtsbindung der Gemeinschaftsorgane durch eine Erklärung beseitigt werden sollten, knüpfte an eine kurz zuvor erprobte Innovation an. Rat und Parlament hatten sich 1975 auf eine inhaltliche Beteiligung des Parlaments an der Gesetzgebung, das Konzertierungsverfahren, geeinigt, was eine Folge des Brüsseler und des Luxemburger Vertrages war. Beide Verträge hatten das Haushaltsverfahren für das Parlament geöffnet – nun stand die aus dem Konstitutionalismus des 19. Jahrhunderts bekannte, parlamentarische Mitwirkung über das Budgetrecht im Raum. Die Spin‑Doktoren in den Juristischen Diensten der Organe hatten sich überlegt, das Verfahren in einer Erklärung zu regeln, denn die Verträge konnten und sollten dafür nicht geändert werden; zugleich war aber eine zumindest „weiche Normativität“ erwünscht.[8]

Meinhard Hilf, 1970er[9]

Auch wenn es keine greifbaren Erinnerungsspuren am Institut zu dem Dossier gibt, war es kein Zufall, dass die Europäische Kommission gerade das Max‑Planck‑Institut mit der Studie beauftragt hatte. Zwischen beiden Institutionen bestand nämlich über Meinhard Hilf eine persönliche Verbindung. Hilf, der 1972 in Heidelberg bei Herrmann Mosler promoviert worden war, arbeitete von 1974 bis 1976 im Juristischen Dienst der Kommission. Im Jahr 1977 kehrte er als Referent an das Institut zurück, um sich bei Bernhardt zu habilitieren. Ob der Autor der Studie seine Empfehlung, eine Organerklärung abgeben zu lassen, aus eigenem Antrieb formulierte oder ob die Studie wissenschaftliche Legitimation für einen bereits zuvor gefassten Plan geben sollte, muss an dieser Stelle offenbleiben.

Die Episode zeigt die Funktion und das Selbstverständnis des Max‑Planck‑Instituts, den Heidelberg Approach, exemplarisch auf: Als regierungsnahes Forschungsinstitut stellte es kurzfristig seine vergleichende und rechtsdogmatische Expertise, seine sprachlichen, personellen und bibliothekarischen Ressourcen in den Dienst eines übergeordneten politischen Ziels der Bundesrepublik – der europäische Integration. Zugleich leistete es einen originären Beitrag zum europäischen Grundrechtsschutz, es blieb nicht bei der Studie; Der Studienauftrag beschäftigte das Institut und die Genannten darüber hinaus, wie die große Tagung zeigt, die 1976 in Heidelberg zum europäischen Grundrechtsschutz stattfand und ein Jahr später in der Schwarzen Reihe veröffentlicht wurde.[10] Mit seinen persönlichen Verbindungen in das Auswärtige Amt,  die Europäische Kommission und das Bundesverfassungsgericht, dessen Präsident dem wissenschaftlichen Beirat des Instituts vorsitzt,[11] war es der Knotenpunkt eines Netzwerks juristischer Kommunikation.

Die Direktoren des Instituts waren auch vor und nach dieser Episode an wichtigen Ereignissen und Entwicklungen der europäischen Integration beteiligt. Hermann Mosler wirkte bekanntermaßen beratend an den Verhandlungen zur Montanunion mit und hat Schlüsselaufsätze in der ZaöRV dazu veröffentlicht.[12] Jochen Frowein, der 1981 an das Institut berufen wurde, hatte bereits 1972 am Vedel‑Bericht mitgeschrieben. Der Bericht war eine scharfsichtige, analytische Bilanz des institutionellen Rahmens der Gemeinschaften kurz nach Ende der zwölfjährigen Übergangszeit, der umfassende Vorschläge für eine Parlamentarisierung enthielt.[13] Gegen Ende seiner Amtszeit war er einer der „drei Weisen“, deren Bericht im September 2000 die „Causa Austria“, die diplomatische Sanktionierung Österreichs wegen der Regierungsbeteiligung der FPÖ, beendete.[14]

Gleichwohl will ich folgende These formulieren: „Europarecht“ war das mit leichtem Argwohn betrachtete neue Rechtsgebiet, das die Aufmerksamkeit von dem eigentlichem Erkenntnisgegenstand, dem Völkerrecht, abzuziehen drohte. Das galt jedenfalls für europarechtlich-operative Themen jenseits der Vertragsgrundlagen.[15] Der „Europarechtler“ war bis in die 1990er Jahre nicht der Typus von Nachwuchswissenschaftler oder Referent, den das Institut bevorzugte. Als Zusatzqualifikation und als pragmatische Notwendigkeit, berufungsfähig zu werden, war es geduldet. Als eigenständiges Gebiet, das als im Grunde Verwaltungsrecht und damit außerhalb der Institutszuständigkeit liegend betrachtet wurde, war es jedenfalls bis Anfang der 2000er Jahre beargwöhnt. Noch als ein sehr bekannter, neuer Direktor mit, unter anderem, starkem europarechtlichen Profil berufen wurde, hieß es intern, man hoffe, er mache Wirtschaftsvölkerrecht und nicht zu viel Europarecht.

***

[1] BVerfGE 37, 271-305 – Solange I; zu den nationalen und europäischen Folgen des Beschlusses: Bill Davies, Pushing Back: What Happens When Member States Resist the European Court of Justice?, Contemporary European History 21 (2012), 417-435.

[2] BVerfGE 154, 17-152 – PSPP.

[3] Rudolf Bernhardt, Probleme eines Grundrechtskatalogs für die Europäischen Gemeinschaften: Studie, Bulletin der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 1976, Beilage 5/76, 25.

[4] Foto: MPIL.

[5] Bernhardt (Fn. 3).

[6] Europäische Kommission, Audiovisual Service, Signature of a joint declaration on the respect of fundamental rights by the EP, the Council and the CEC, ID: P-015852/00-01.

[7] Gemeinsame Erklärung des Europäischen Parlaments, des Rates und der Kommission, Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 27. April 1977, ABl. 1977, C 103/1.

[8] Näher: Frank Schorkopf, Die unentschiedene Macht, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2023, 158 ff., 170.

[9] Foto: MPIL.

[10] Herrmann Mosler/Rudolf Bernhardt/Meinhard Hilf (Hrsg.), Grundrechtsschutz in Europa. Europäische Menschenrechts-Konvention und Europäische Gemeinschaften. Internationales Kolloquium veranstaltet vom Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht Heidelberg, Berlin: Springer 1977.

[11] Vgl. in diesem Kontext: Ernst Benda/Eckart Klein, Das Spannungsverhältnis von Grundrechten und übernationalem Recht, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 89 (1974), 389 ff.

[12] Hermann Mosler, Der Vertrag über die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl – Entstehung und Qualifizierung, ZaöRV 14 (1951/52), 1- 45; Hermann Mosler, Zur Anwendung der Grundsatzartikel des Vertrages über die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl, ZaöRV 17 (1956), 407-427; Hermann Mosler, Begriff und Gegenstand des Europarechts, ZaöRV 28 (1968), 481-502.

[13] Bericht der ad hoc-Gruppe für die Prüfung der Frage einer Erweiterung der Befugnisse des Europäischen Parlaments („Bericht Vedel“),25.3.1972, Bulletin der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 1972,  Beilage 4/72, 7-85, 83 ff., auszugsweise zugänglich unter https://www.cvce.eu/de/obj/auszug_aus_dem_bericht_vedel_uber_die_entwicklung_der_praktiken_der_zusammenarbeit_zwischen_den_institutionen_25_marz_1972-de-5b08539b-cac2-43dc-85d9-2ecafb02bba5.html.

[14] Siehe: Constanze Jeitler, An “Almost Impossible Mission”: MPIL Director Jochen Abr. Frowein and the “EU Sanctions Against Austria” in 2000, MPIL100.de.

[15] Der vom Institut, besonders von Jochen Frowein, bearbeitete europäische Menschenrechtsschutz durch die EMRK ist davon ausgenommen, allerdings ist dieser als völkervertragliches Instrument des Menschenrechtsschutzes dem Völkerrecht zuzuordnen.

English

How the MPIL’s “Heidelberg Approach” Helped Resolve a Crisis in the 1970s

In May 1974, the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) published its famous Solange I decision. The Second Senate had found that the lack of fundamental rights protection in the European Communities necessitated the application of German fundamental rights law to European secondary law as long as (“solange”) there was no catalogue of fundamental rights adopted by the European Parliament.[1]  The decision triggered a legal and diplomatic crisis – very similar to the events that unfolded after the PSPP judgement in May 2020.[2]

Until now, little attention has been drawn to the fact that the Max Planck Institute was actively involved in resolving this crisis – this episode will be the subject of the following miniature. At the end, it provides an opportunity to formulate a thesis on the role of EU law in the institute’s work and self-image at the end of the 1990s.

Fundamental rights are an “outstanding achievement of the modern constitutional state.”[3]  Their general purpose lies in protecting the individual by limiting state power and enabling political participation; in some legal systems, fundamental rights also promise social emancipation. With the European Court of Justice substantiating the political power of the European Communities on the basis of an autonomous legal order in order to make the European Union’s actions as independent as possible from the member states, it now also required an acceptable form of fundamental rights protection.

Rudolf Berhardt at his inauguration as director of the institute, 1970[4]

This was the essence of a study published by Rudolf Bernhardt, the institute’s director at the time, on “Problems of a Catalogue of Fundamental Rights for the European Communities” („Probleme eines Grundrechtskatalogs für die Europäischen Gemeinschaften“) in the Bulletin of the Communities in 1976. The study was published together with a report by the European Commission on the “Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Creation and Development of Community Law”.[5]  This link was no coincidence. The Commission had commissioned the study from Bernhardt. It was intended to underpin its strategy for binding the European Communities to fundamental rights.

The study follows a comparative law approach, for which Bernhardt tapped into the expertise of the research fellows. Karin Oellers, Eckart Klein and Christian Tomuschat, among others, contributed to the study, which analysed the commitment to fundamental rights in the other member states of the Communities. The study, sound and sober in tone, concluded that the Community is indeed bound by fundamental rights in the form of general legal principles, which – due to the nature of the process – can only be developed incrementally. Nevertheless, it found, there was legal uncertainty and the binding nature of those principles for the European institutions, namely the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission, was sometimes ambiguous.

The study ended with the surprising recommendation to have the three institutions make a declaration on their commitment to the fundamental rights developed by the European Court of Justice. That was what ensued: On 5 April 1977, the presidents of the three institutions, president of the Commission Roy Jenkins, president of the parliament Emilio Colombo, and president of the Council David Owen, signed a Joint Declaration in Luxembourg,[6] binding the institutions to the praetorian protection of fundamental rights.[7]  The Court of Justice itself was left out, which was understandable from a methodological and practical point of view, as it recognised – i.e. invented and concretised – precisely those Community fundamental rights. Nevertheless, a pattern emerged, as the Court’s cautious approach to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which has been proclaimed but did not enter into force legally yet, showed a good 20 years later.

Dispelling the doubts about the Community institutions’ commitment to fundamental rights by means of a declaration was a course of action based on an innovation that had been tried out shortly before. In 1975, the Council and Parliament had agreed on a substantive involvement of the Parliament in the legislative process, the conciliation procedure, which was a consequence of the Brussels and Luxembourg Treaties. Both treaties had opened up the budgetary procedure to the European Parliament – now parliamentary involvement via budgetary power, familiar from 19th century constitutionalism, was on the cards. The spin doctors in the legal services of the institutions had considered laying out the procedure in a declaration, as the treaties could not and were not supposed to be amended for this purpose, while at the same time, however, at least “soft normativity” was desired. [8]

Meinhard Hilf, 1970s[9]

Even if there are no tangible traces of the dossier at the Institute, it was no coincidence that the European Commission had explicitly commissioned the Max Planck Institute with the study. There was a personal connection between the two institutions through Meinhard Hilf. Hilf, who had obtained his doctorate in Heidelberg in 1972 under Herrmann Mosler, worked in the Commission’s legal service from 1974 to 1976. In 1977, he returned to the Institute as a research fellow to complete his habilitation under Bernhardt. Whether the author of the study formulated his recommendation to have the European institutions make a declaration on his own initiative or whether the study was intended to provide scientific support for a plan that had already been drawn up must be left open at this point.

In any case, the episode exemplifies the Heidelberg Approach, the function and self-image of the Max Planck Institute: As a government-related research institute, it placed its comparative and dogmatic expertise, its linguistic, human, and library resources at the service of an overarching political goal of the Federal Republic of Germany, namely European integration. At the same time, it made a singular contribution to the protection of European fundamental rights – also beyond the study itself. The topic was dealt with extensively by the institute and its researchers, as shown by the major conference held in Heidelberg in 1976 on the protection of European fundamental rights, which was published a year later in the Black Series (“Schwarze Reihe”).[10]  With its personal connections to the Foreign Office, the European Commission and the Federal Constitutional Court, whose President chairs the Institute’s Scientific Advisory Board,[11] it was the hub of a network of legal communication.

The directors of the Institute were also involved in important events and developments in European integration before and after this episode. Hermann Mosler is known to have been involved in an advisory capacity in the negotiations on the European Coal and Steel Community and published key articles on the subject in the institute’s journal Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV; English title: Heidelberg Journal of International Law, HJIL).[12]  Jochen Frowein, who was appointed to the Institute in 1981, had already contributed to the “Vedel Report” in 1972. The report was a perceptive, analytical assessment of the institutional framework of the Communities shortly after the end of the twelve‑year transition period, which contained comprehensive proposals for parliamentarisation.[13]  Towards the end of his directorship, he was one of the “three wise men” whose report in September 2000 put an end to the “Causa Austria”, the diplomatic sanctions imposed on Austria because of the FPÖ’s participation in government.[14]

Nevertheless, I would like to conclude with the following thesis: “EU law” was a new field of law viewed with slight suspicion as it threatened to draw attention away from the core object of interest, international law. This was certainly the case for issues relating to operative EU law beyond the foundations of the treaties.[15]  Until the 1990s, the “European law scholar” was not the type of junior academic or research fellow favoured by the Institute. EU law was tolerated as an additional qualification and as a pragmatic necessity to become eligible for appointment. As an independent field, which was regarded essentially administrative law and therefore outside the Institute’s remit, it was frowned upon until the early 2000s. Even when a very well-known new director with, among other things, a strong European law profile, was appointed, word was one hoped that he would focus on international trade law and not EU law.

Translation from the German original: Sarah Gebel

[1] BVerfGE 37, 271-305 – Solange I; On the national and international aftermath of the decision: Bill Davies, Pushing Back: What Happens When Member States Resist the European Court of Justice?, Contemporary European History 21 (2012), 417-435.

[2] BVerfGE 154, 17-152 – PSPP.

[3] Rudolf Bernhardt, Probleme eines Grundrechtskatalogs für die Europäischen Gemeinschaften: Studie, Bulletin of the European Communities 1976, supplement 5/76, 25.

[4] Photo: MPIL.

[5] Rudolf Bernhardt (fn. 3).

[6] European Commission, Audiovisual Service, Signature of a joint declaration on the respect of fundamental rights by the EP, the Council and the CEC, ID: P-015852/00-01.

[7] Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, Official Journal of the European Communities, 27 April 1977, C 103/1.

[8] For further reference: Frank Schorkopf, Die unentschiedene Macht, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2023, 158 ff., 170.

[9] Photo: MPIL.

[10] Herrmann Mosler/ Rudolf Bernhardt/ Meinhard Hilf (eds.), Grundrechtsschutz in Europa. Europäische Menschenrechts-Konvention und Europäische Gemeinschaften. Internationales Kolloquium veranstaltet vom Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht Heidelberg, Berlin: Springer 1977.

[11] In this context, cf: Ernst Benda/Eckart Klein, Das Spannungsverhältnis von Grundrechten und übernationalem Recht, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 89 (1974), 389 ff.

[12] Hermann Mosler, Der Vertrag über die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl – Entstehung und Qualifizierung, HJIL 14 (1951/52), 1- 45; Hermann Mosler, Zur Anwendung der Grundsatzartikel des Vertrages über die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl, HJIL 17 (1956), 407-427; Hermann Mosler, Begriff und Gegenstand des Europarechts, HJIL 28 (1968), 481-502.

[13] Report of the Working Party examining the problem of the extension of the powers of the European Parliament (“Vedel Report”), 25 March 1972, Bulletin of the European Communities 1972, supplement 4/72, 7-85, 83ff, available at: Archive of European Integration (pitt.edu).

[14] See: Constanze Jeitler, An “Almost Impossible Mission”: MPIL Director Jochen Abr. Frowein and the “EU Sanctions Against Austria” in 2000, MPIL100.de.

[15] This excludes human rights protection under the European Convention of Human Rights, which has been researched at the institute, especially by Jochen Frowein. It is, as an international treaty on human rights, however, part of international law.

An “Almost Impossible Mission”: MPIL Director Jochen Abr. Frowein and the “EU Sanctions Against Austria” in 2000

19. April 2024
Constanze Jeitler
Kommentare 1

In the summer of 2000, the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (MPIL) was at the centre of European legal debates and Austrian media attention: The institute’s director Jochen Abr. Frowein had been nominated alongside Martti Ahtisaari and Marcelino Oreja as one of the so-called three Wise Men to evaluate the fourteen EU member states “measures against the Austrian government”. The question at the heart of this European affair – how should the union monitor and sanction a member state in violation of shared European values? – was posed at a critical moment in the EU history and concerns us until today.

Introduction

In late August 2000, journalists outnumbered researchers and students at 535 Neuenheimer Feld in Heidelberg. On this cool summer day, director Jochen Abr. Frowein was not amused about the media frenzy at the MPIL as he made his way through a jungle of cameras for a meeting with former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari and former European Commissioner Marcelino Oreja.[1] These three “Wise Men” had been nominated earlier in the summer by Luzius Wildhaber, the president of the European Court of Human Rights to investigate “the Austrian Government’s obligations to the European values, in particular in regard to the rights of minorities, refugees and immigrants,” and “the development of the political nature of the FPÖ.”[2]

This mission was the final chapter in the struggle over the so-called “EU sanctions against Austria” between the Vienna government and the fourteen member states of the EU (EU‑14). These diplomatic and bilateral measures had been imposed after the far‑right Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ) had entered a government coalition with the conservative Österreichische Volkspartei (Austrian People’s Party, ÖVP) in February 2000. The sanctions reduced diplomatic relations to a technical level and at EU summits, ministers refused to shake hands or pose for photos with their Austrian counterparts. Some statements related to the sanctions bordered on the bizarre: For example, Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel called on Belgians to cancel their winter vacation Austrian as he considered skiing in Austria “immoral” in the current situation (he later apologized for this statement).[3] Thus, the measures were neither actual political or economic sanctions nor had they been imposed by the European Union. As symbolic gestures, they expressed the concerns of the EU‑14 over a far‑right party joining a national government as a result of the surge of xenophobia, racism, and right-wing populism across Europe after the end of the Cold War. The Austrian government rejected the “sanctions”, arguing that they represented a violation of the “fundamental legal principles and the spirit of the European treaties”.[4]

The “sanctions” coincided with a critical moment in the history of European integration: Since the late 1980s, the EU had assumed a role as protector and promoter of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. These common European values played a crucial role in transforming the union from an economic into a political one. Simultaneously, institutional reform was underway to enable the accession of new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. At this watershed and for the first time in EU history, the “sanctions” called into question the formation of a national government by citing potential violations of common European values. This conflict between the EU‑14 and the Austrian government has become ingrained in institutional memory as it accelerated the introduction of a specific mechanism for sanctioning. At the same time, this historical episode continues to paralyze the EU when it comes to handling violations of its fundamental values in a member state.[5] As such, the “sanctions” have served as a cautionary tale for the EU for two reasons: First, they created an opportunity for the controversial Austrian government to increase its popularity by claiming that foreign powers were trying to undermine the outcome of a democratic election. While only 53,82 percent of the electorate had voted for ÖVP and FPÖ in the previous election, polls showed that a vast majority of voters opposed the “sanctions” – which were perceived as an unjust stigmatization of the country’s population as “Nazis” – and supported the resistance of the new government.[6] Second, the “sanctions” were imposed without any conditions for their abolition and it had thus to be assumed that only the collapse of the government would end them.[7] After months of deadlock, the Austrian government threatened to block further institutional reform in the EU, legitimized by a popular referendum (Volksbefragung) in Austria on “the further development of EU law”.[8] Simultaneously, the European Commission and the European Parliament had urged the EU‑14 to re‑evaluate the measures and find a solution acceptable to all sides.[9]

Finally, the Portuguese Council Presidency asked the president of the European Court on Human Rights, Luzius Wildhaber, to appoint “three personalities” to deliver a report on the Austrian government’s “commitment to the European values” and the “political nature of the FPÖ” at the end of June.[10] The social democrat Ahtisaari and the conservative Oreja were appointed due to their long careers in politics and diplomacy, in particular concerning international law and human rights. Meanwhile, Frowein was chosen based on his excellent reputation for his work at the intersection of theory and practice of international law and human rights, especially through his long‑standing membership of the European Commission for Human Rights from 1973 to 1993.[11] During his academic career, Frowein made significant contributions to the study of the prohibition of the use of force under international law, the right to self‑defense, and the protection of human rights at the local and universal level, e.g.  on the freedoms of expression, assembly, and religion, as well as the prohibition of discrimination and asylum law.[12]

The Wise Men in Vienna

Following a preliminary meeting in Helsinki on 20 July, Frowein, Ahtisaari, and Oreja re-convened in Vienna for their “almost impossible mission” of putting “an entire country under scrutiny.[13] Frowein was the first to arrive in Vienna on a rainy 27 July. A small crowd of journalists and protesters welcomed the MPIL director on Vienna’s Ringstraße in front of the noble Hotel Imperial.[14] The next day, the Wise Men began their “intensive program” of meetings with Austrian officials to discuss the commitment of the Austrian government to common European values.[15] No minor detail about the delicate mission – e.g. the traditional Austrian dishes served at the lunch with chancellor Schüssel (Rindssuppe, Tafelspitz, Topfennockerl) – went unnoticed by the Austrian media, as Frowein, Ahtisaari, and Oreja gave journalists very little to report as they “appeared unnoticed” on the scene, “remained eloquently silent” in front of the journalists” and “disappeared again quickly”.[16] While the media soon grew frustrated with the trio, the interlocutors were “extremely impressed” by their “meticulous preparation”.[17]

The MPIL’s very own “Jörgi-Bär” [19]

While the Wise Men met with the FPÖ leadership at the time to assess the “political nature” of their party, they did not meet with the man often considered solely responsible for the party’s success: Jörg Haider was a controversial and charismatic figure in Austrian politics whose recipe for success consisted of combining far-right poliicy with populist rhetoric. However, by the summer of 2000, Haider was, according to his own description, only a “simple party member” as he had stepped down as party leader to appease domestic and international criticism of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition. Nevertheless, the FPÖ made sure that the Wise Men received a symbolic effigy of their figurehead: A  so-called “Jörgi-Bär”, a small stuffed teddy bear the FPÖ had handed out as a giveaway in the previous election campaign, was sent to Heidelberg by the party as part of an information package. Until today, this small teddy bear can be found in the MPIL’s archive. The Austrian daily Der Standard cynically remarked that this was nothing but a “cuddle attack” on the Wise Men by the FPÖ to trivialize their extreme agenda.[18]

The Wise Men in Heidelberg and the Final Report

One month later, the trio reconvened at the seat of Frowein’s Institute to hold additional meetings and to finalize their report. More than twenty representatives of Austrian civil society flocked to the MPIL in Heidelberg. Opposition parties and NGOs criticized that the trio had only met with government officials during their visit to Vienna. The human rights organization SOS Mitmensch had asked for a meeting with Frowein specifically as they considered him to be “especially sensitive” to their concerns about the recent surge of racism and xenophobia in Austria.[20] Frowein, Ahtisaari, and Oreja “pricked up their ears” as the civil society representatives reported on the radicalization of the political climate since the FPÖ had joined the coalition.[21] After their final meeting with vice‑chancellor and FPÖ leader Susanne Riess‑Passer, the trio had “enough material to fill a library”. [22] Martti Ahtisaari mused that he would not mind if finishing the report would take a little longer and his stay at the MPIL would be extended as he had not been to Heidelberg since 1985.[23]

On 8 September 2000,  Frowein, Ahtisaari, and Oreja traveled to Paris to meet with President Jacques Chirac who was heading the French Council Presidency. Unlike their biblical eponyms, these Wise Men did not bring gold, frankincense, and myrrh but their Report on the Austrian Government’s Commitment to the Common European Values, in Particular concerning the Rights of Minorities, Refugees and Immigrants, and the Evolution of the Political Nature of the FPÖ[24]. The ceremonial handover in the Élysée Palace was disturbed by a “diplomatic scandal” characteristic of the early internet age: The Spanish daily El País leaked the report before Chirac received it.[25] After Chirac had received the report, it was made available to the general public on the MPIL’s website, which had been introduced in 1996 (for more on the digital transformation at the institute see the contribution by Annika Knauer on this blog).[26]

The beginnings of the Internet: Jochen Frowein on the news portal “Paperball” (Photo: MPIL)

The report found that the new Austrian government was committed to common European values. Its “respect in particular for the rights of minorities, refugees and immigrants is not inferior” and could even be considered higher than in other EU member states.[27] Furthermore, the report assessed that the Austrian government had taken steps to combat historical revisionism, discrimination, and prejudice. Regarding the “political nature of the FPÖ”, the trio voiced stronger concerns as they characterized it as a “right‑wing populist party with radical elements”, pointing out that the party “enforced xenophobic sentiments in campaigns”.[28] In addition, the report condemned the FPÖ’s practice of “suppress[ing] criticism by the continuous use of libel procedures” against journalists and researchers.[29] While the report stated that the measures “heightened awareness of the importance of the common European values” and “energized civil society” to defend them, Frowein, Ahtisaari, and Oreja also stressed that they “have in some cases been wrongly understood as sanctions directed against Austrian citizens” and were therefore simultaneously “counterproductive”.[30] A few days later, the EU‑14 followed the recommendations of the Wise Men and lifted the measures against the Austrian government.[31] Finally, Frowein, Ahtisaari, and Oreja urged the EU to develop a mechanism for evaluating member states’ commitment to common European values. They recommended the “introduction of preventive and monitoring procedures into Article 7 of the EU Treaty [EUT] so that a situation similar to the current situation in Austria would be dealt with within the EU from the very start.”[32]

Conclusion

Less than a year later, at the Summit in Nice in February 2001, the EU introduced a mechanism for sanctioning member states’ violations of European values, with the suspension of voting rights of the accused member state as a last resort. In a crucial moment of  EU history and as European values were put to the test, MPIL director Jochen Abr. Frowein alongside Maarti Ahtisaari and Marcelino Oreja was sent to Vienna on a delicate mission. The contributed to reforming how the EU protects and promotes its common values – at least on paper.

The question of how the EU should promote its common values and sanction those who violate them concerns the union to this day and perhaps now more than ever. The lesson of the measures taken by the EU‑14 against the Austrian government is twofold: On the one hand, they accelerated the introduction of a clear procedure in the TEU. On the other hand, the EU has been notoriously cautious to trigger this mechanism against members such as Hungary and Poland. Beyond the internal workings of the union, increasingly the question arises how the EU wants to promote its values beyond its member states and how far it is willing to go, as the debates about military assistance for Ukraine and the introduction of the EU Supply Chain Directive have shown. There is still plenty to discuss in Europe and at the MPIL about common European values, their promotion, and enforcement. It remains an “almost impossible mission.”

[1] Eva Linsinger, ‘Da haben sie die Ohren gespitzt‘: Menschenrechtsgruppen und Riess-Passer bei den drei Weisen in Heidelberg,“ Der Standard, 31 August 2000.

[2] Waldemar Hummer, The End of EU Sanctions against Austria – A Precedent for New Sanctions Procedures?, The European Legal Forum 2 (2000), 77-83, 79.

[3] Belgiens Außenminister Michel nennt eigene Äußerungen ’dumm‘, Tagesspiegel, 27 February 2000.

[4] Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Außenpolitischer Bericht 2000: Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Außenpolitik, Wien: Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten 2000, 30.

[5] Kim Lane Scheppele/Laurent Pech, Didn’t the EU Learn That These Rule-of-Law Interventions Don’t Work?, Verfassungsblog, 9 March 2018.

[6] Andreas Middel, Wien zeigt sich gegenüber der EU stur, Die Welt, 3 June 2000.

[7] Frank Schorkopf, Die Maßnahmen der XIV EU-Mitgliedstaaten gegen Österreich: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer “streitbaren Demokratie” auf europäischer Ebene, Berlin: Springer 2002, 145.

[8] Bericht des Hauptausschusses über den Antrag 211/A, Nr. 268 der Beilagen zu den Stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates, XXI. GP, Wien: Österreichisches Parlament, 11 July 2000.

[9] Hummer (fn. 2), 78.

[10] Schorkopf (fn. 7), 161.

[11] Porträts, Die Presse, 9 September 2000.

[12] Rüdiger Wolfrum, Jochen Abr. Frowein Zum 70. Geburtstag, Archiv des Öffentlichen Rechts 129 (2004), 330–332.

[13] Eine fast unmögliche Mission, Der Standard, 28 July 2000.

[14] Susanna Heubusch, Privatbutler und Topfennockerl – erlesener Service für den ‚Weisenrat‘, Kurier, 30 July 2000.

[15] Karl Ettinger/Friederike Leibl, Drei Weise, zehn Sessel 100 Journalisten, Die Presse, 29/30 July 2000; for a complete list of the meetings held in Vienna, see: Schorkopf (fn. 7), 195–97.

[16] Ettinger/Leibl (fn. 16).

[17] Heubusch (fn. 15); Drei Weise prüfen Österreich: ‘Sie meinen es sehr ernst‘, Die Presse, 29/30 July 2000.

[18] Eva Linsinger, FPÖ-Kuscheloffensive, Der Standard, 25 July 2000.

[19] Photo: MPIL.

[20] Fakten statt Diffamierung, News, 33/2000.

[21] Linsinger, Ohren (fn.1).

[22] Eva Linsinger, Das Ende einer Dienstfahrt, Der Standard, 31 August 2000.

[23] Linsinger, Ende (fn. 23).

[24] Martti Ahtisaari/Abraham Frowein/Marcelino Oreja, Report on the Austrian Government’s Commitment to the Common European Values, in Particular Concerning the Rights of Minorities, Refugees and Immigrants, and the Evolution of the Political Nature of the FPÖ (the Wise Men Report), International Legal Materials 40 (2001), 102–123.

[25] Nikolaus Nowak, Diplomatischer Skandal: ‚El Pais‘ bekam Bericht zu Österreich vor Chirac, Die Presse, 9 September 2000.

[26] Under Frowein’s leadership, the MPIL had become a trailblazer for digitization in the MPG, see: Rudolf Bernhardt/Karin Oellers-Frahm, Das Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Contributions on Comparative Public Law and International Law, Vol. 270, Heidelberg: Springer 2018, 23.

[27] Ahtisaari/Frowein/Oreja (fn. 25), 119.

[28] Ahtisaari/Frowein/Oreja (fn. 25), 120.

[29] Ahtisaari/Frowein/Oreja (fn. 25), 120.

[30] Ahtisaari/Frowein/Oreja (fn. 25), 121.

[31] Schorkopf (fn. 7), 201-202.

[32] Ahtisaari/Frowein/Oreja (fn. 25), 120.